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“Own Yourself, Woman:” Toni Morrison’s  
A Mercy, Early Modernity, and Property 
Samira Spatzek  
In 2008 Toni Morrison published her ninth novel A Mercy, which is set in 
seventeenth-century colonial Virginia—a period in which conceptions of 
individual liberty and property would develop against the backdrop of 
European colonization. In this essay I will explore Morrison’s use of vari-
ous characters in the novel as a means both re-visit and re-assess early 
modern Enlightenment constructions of property and freedom.1  
In the context of European colonial expansion and increasingly with the 
development of the Atlantic slave trade, early European modernity and 
individualism can be said to have emerged first and foremost, 
through metaphors of property. […] Where an earlier, hierarchical view 
assumed that people’s identities (their properties, if you will) were defined 
by their place in society, the assumption was now that who one was was 
based on what one had, rather than the other way round. (Graeber 36) 
The European settlers imagined what they called the New World as a 
space that could be shaped according to their values. As literary scholar 
Gesa Mackenthun has put it, the colonization of America was accompa-
nied by a “process of ideological homogenization in Europe by providing 
new opportunities for cultural and national self-definition,” which went 
hand in hand with an understanding of the English colonial subject as 
predominantly male, white, and superior to the ‘uncivilized’ (15). At the 
same time, the early modern colonial project merged with and expanded 
on “the domestic ideologies that Christian Europe had developed in rela-
tion to its internal others” (15), so that from the middle of the seventeenth 
century onwards the principle of the individual came to be organized 
around notions of private property. 
A Mercy investigates this environment of the New World and its newly 
conceptualized notions of individual liberty and property at a time when 
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these notions had not yet acquired the strong racial connotations that they 
would develop at a later stage in US history.2 As literary scholar La Vinia 
Delois Jennings has put it, A Mercy’s late seventeenth-century plot invites 
the twenty-first-century reader to “consider a sectarian America as its ra-
cial divide unfolded. Dichotomies of racial superiority and inferiority, 
humanness and subhumanness, had yet to claim en masse the popular 
and, later, national psyche” (645).  
Set in the 1690s, the novel tells the story of Florens, a black servant girl 
who is the property of the Dutch farmer and trader Jacob Vaark (also 
called Sir). She lives on his farm with a group of women: Vaark’s wife Re-
bekka (also called Mistress); a Native American servant called Lina; a 
shipwrecked black girl called Sorrow/Twin; as well as with the two white 
indentured servants Willard and Scully whose services Vaark regularly 
makes use of even though they belong to the household of a neighboring 
farm. What all of the novel’s characters have in common is that they at-
tempt to negotiate their individual freedom and servitude/enslavement, 
respectively, in potentially dangerous, uncharted waters.3 In this essay I 
argue that A Mercy scrutinizes the early modern paradigm of a free and 
propertied individual by way of a refusal to create characters that func-
tion according to this paradigm. As the story unfolds on various intersect-
ing narrative levels, some of the characters are violently expelled from the 
narrative orbit: Vaark falls ill with the pox and dies. When his wife Re-
bekka gets infected with the pox, too, she sends Florens to fetch a black-
smith for help. As I will show, this disposal of some of the characters 
works as the lever with which Morrison critiques early modern constitu-
tions of the human subject as they were conceived by John Locke and oth-
ers during the period in which the novel is set. 
Within Black Studies the connections of modernity, blackness, and 
slavery and their discursive as well as structural manifestations have been 
intensely debated. Recently, critics have provided a radical critique of 
(early) modern Enlightenment conceptions of the human subject (‘man’) 
as inherently white (e.g. Broeck, Weheliye, Wilderson, Wynter), arguing 
that the production of this subject has been premised on the structural 
“desubjectification of humans” (Broeck 245), that is, on the “banishment 
[of the Black] from the Human fold” (Wilderson 9).   
These debates inform my analysis of A Mercy.4 While critics like Valerie 
Babb and Maxine L. Montgomery have characterized the novel as a type 
of alternative American origins narrative and have looked at the novel’s 
characters’ multiple ethnic and national backgrounds, as yet, scholars 
have not read A Mercy in terms of the ongoing debate about the early 
modern conceptions of ‘man’ in Black Studies. This essay adds to the cur-
rent criticism of A Mercy the suggestion to read the novel as a radical cri-
tique of early modern subject discourses. I contend that such a reading 
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allows for a reassessment of the early modern entanglements of property 
and freedom that were always already modeled against the figure of the 
‘Black,’ whose position was one of “a paradigmatic impossibility in the 
Western Hemisphere” (Wilderson 9).   
I thus enter the novel into conversation with John Locke’s 1689 Two 
Treatises5, a text that has been paradigmatic in shaping the discourses of 
early modernity and that is generally considered as “the conventional 
way to conceptualize the relationship between the Enlightenment and 
America” (Greeson 6). In this respect, I will, first of all, briefly discuss two 
recent interventions in the body of Locke criticism that open up the dis-
cussion of Locke’s ideas of individual liberty and property by introducing 
the notion of New World slavery. Secondly, I will examine how Locke’s 
ideas are rendered problematic in A Mercy by performing a close reading 
of three of the novel’s characters – Jacob Vaark, the blacksmith, and 
Florens – and argue that Locke’s conceptions of individual liberty and 
property are re-configured on the aesthetic level of representation.  
Being the ‘Proprietor of One’s Person and Capacities:’ John Locke’s 
Treatises, Slavery, and the Concept of Property  
John Locke published his Treatises in 1689, at a time when,  
[c]olonial space and its mercantile and productive possibilities provided 
English gentlemen as a group with an experience of entitlement to being 
properly themselves and knowing/owning the world for themselves, 
hitherto unknown to but a very small number of Europeans—it opened a 
window on becoming possessors instead of being possessed. (Broeck 239) 
In the Treatises Locke would break new ground with his arguments for 
“freedom as self-possession [that] strategically reject any absolutist volunta-
rism and boldly advance the rights and obligations of the emerging en-
lightened subject—as an individual and as a group—and their appropri-
ate political representation” (Broeck 236, emphasis in original), which he 
would conceptualize in his famous dictum of private property as man’s 
“life, liberty and estate” (Locke 323-24, 350, 383). The majority of modern 
as well as postmodern readings of the Treatises generally have celebrated 
Locke’s conceptualizations of individual liberty as universal ethics ever 
since. C. B. Macpherson’s study The Political Theory of Possessive Individual-
ism (1962) offered one of the first critiques of the political philosophy of 
Locke and Hobbes from the Left, and has remained a point of reference 
for later critical engagements.  
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In his study, Macpherson argues that in seventeenth-century England 
“a new belief in the value and the rights of the individual” (1) developed, 
which fundamentally had a “possessive quality” to it (3). As he states,   
The relation of ownership, having become for more and more men the 
critically important relation determining their actual freedom and actual 
prospect of realizing their full potentialities, was read back into the nature of 
the individual. The individual, it was thought, is free inasmuch as he is 
proprietor of his person and capacities. The human essence is freedom from 
dependence on the wills of others, and freedom is a function of possession. 
Society becomes a lot of free equal individuals related to each as proprietors 
of their own capacities and of what they have acquired by their exercise. 
Society consists of relations of exchange between proprietors. (3)  
Macpherson referred to this principle of the propertied individual as pos-
sessive individualism. He argued that it would become a doctrine founda-
tional to all modern theories of the rights of man, which remains a widely 
accepted insight until today (Graeber 36). As one of the key texts from the 
period, Locke’s Treatises is firmly based on the notion of possessive indi-
vidualism.  
One of the scholars who has expanded on well-established interpreta-
tions of the Treatises by shifting attention to the transatlantic slave trade 
and the ownership of slaves as essential to the text’s production is Jennifer 
Welchman. In her essay “Locke on Slavery and Inalienable Rights” (1995), 
Welchman presents the reader with a problem that many of Locke’s 
greatest admires have faced. In his famous statement from the first pages 
of the Treatises that “[s]lavery is so vile and miserable an Estate of Man, 
and so directly opposite to the generous Temper and Courage of our Na-
tion; that ‘tis hardly to be conceived, that an Englishman, much less a Gen-
tleman, should plead for’t” (141, emphasis in original), Locke argues 
against slavery. At the same time, this statement stands in stark contrast 
to Locke’s attempt to “legitimize slavery by portraying it as a form of 
punishment for crimes committed where no central political authority or 
justice system exists” (Welchman 67). Welchman contends that the notion 
that slavery might in some cases be “permissible as a form of servitude” 
(and may thus be defended) becomes problematic as soon as we think 
about New World slavery (67). She rightly points out that this has con-
fronted generations of Locke critics with the challenging task of thinking 
up various “ingenious reconstructions” of Locke’s defense of slavery (69).  
Contrary to the well-established strategy of attempting to ‘explain 
away’ this allegedly inconsistent line of thought, Welchman argues that 
the so-called paradox of Locke’s political philosophy of individual liberty, 
on the one hand, and his defense of slavery, on the other, does not exist, 
as a detailed examination of his professional life would prove (71). For 
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example, Locke served on the Board of the Lords Proprietors who pro-
moted the colonization of the territory of Carolina and he was one of the 
original subscribers to the Royal Africa Company, which was established 
in 1671 to supply British colonial projects with slave labor (71–74). This 
rightly leads Welchman to conclude that, 
[w]e cannot know whether Locke intended his defense of slavery […] to 
justify his own involvement with the institution. But we should recognize 
that there is no reason why he could not. Given the premises from which it 
starts, Locke’s defense of slavery works. It legitimizes the enslavement of 
Africans as effectively as it condemns the subjugation of the English people 
by William the Conqueror. (81) 
In her essay “Never Shall We Be Slaves” (2004), literary scholar Sabine 
Broeck draws on the notion that Locke criticism has repeatedly tried to 
pass over the apparent contradiction of Locke’s simultaneous attack on as 
well as defense of slavery in that it has largely failed to consider “the fac-
tor of New World slavery” (239). Expanding on Welchman’s arguments, 
Broeck asserts that, “the rebuttal of ‘slavery’ in the Lockean conception 
had nothing to do with a universal rejection of slavery, but, on the contra-
ry, became a motor of the Atlantic slave trade and of early modern bour-
geois emancipation in tandem” (237; emphasis in original). In this context, 
Locke’s use of the term “slavery” refers to “the oppression [of the rights] 
of free [English] gentlemen” and not to chattel slavery in the New World 
(Broeck 244). The free Lockean gentleman has the right to property in the 
sense that he has the right to own his person as opposed to being subject-
ed to somebody else’s rule. Property in Locke’s logic essentially enables 
the free gentleman “to be precisely distinct and distinguished from slaves 
who are subjected to some other party’s whims and powers” (239, em-
phasis in original). In other words, Locke’s emphasis on defining property 
as freedom as self-possession is rested upon both the objectification and 
the commodification of Africans in the transatlantic slave trade—precisely 
because Locke conceptualizes ownership as both the free gentlemen’s 
right to own himself and to own slaves. As Broeck argues, “African bod-
ies and their labor capacity […] function as the crucial absent presence [in 
the Treatises]. [T]he purposeful ownership of chattel labor is an a priori el-
ement of property deliberately built into the Lockean system, which only 
wants to combat an ownership of and control over persons as English-
men” (242-43, emphasis in original).  
 Whereas Welchman has argued that a closer look at Locke’s career, e.g. 
his subscription to and investments in the Royal Africa Company as the 
main provider of slaves for the English colonial enterprise, would in fact 
reveal a nexus of Locke’s thoughts on slavery and his business invest-
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ments in the New World, Broeck has expanded on this notion on a more 
epistemic level. Treating Locke’s text as a “paradigmatic [as well as] icon-
ographic moment” in the constitution of early European modernity, she 
has claimed that the Treatises do not universally reject slavery but instead 
make a case for the liberty of English gentlemen from feudal rule, which 
at the same time includes these gentlemen’s rights to own actual African 
slaves as their property in the New World (238). Informed by these inter-
ventions in the body of Locke criticism, I will read the character of Jacob 
Vaark back into the early modern Enlightenment paradigm of freedom as 
self-possessed existence as embodied in Locke’s text to then trace the fea-
tures of the free and reasonable Lockean ‘man’ in the character of the 
blacksmith.  
Lockean Characters in A Mercy  
Jacob Vaark enters A Mercy as a settler with high moral commitments. The 
way in which his arrival at the coast of colonial Virginia is narrated is 
reminiscent of the numerous accounts published by seventeenth-century 
European explorers of the ‘New World.’ Vaark steps  
carefully over pebbles and sand to shore. Fog, Atlantic and reeking of plant 
life, blanketed the bay and slowed him. […] Unlike the English fogs he had 
known since he could walk, or those way north where he lived now, this one 
was sun fired, turning the world into thick, hot gold. Penetrating it was like 
struggling through a dream. As mud became swamp grass, he turned left, 
stepping gingerly until he stumbled against wooden planks leading up 
beach toward the village. Other than his own breath and tread, the world 
was soundless. It was only after he reached the live oak trees that the fog 
wavered and split. He moved faster then, more in control but missing, too, 
the blinding gold he had come through. (Morrison 7-8)  
The trope of the fog signifies Vaark’s crossing from the Old World to the 
New as it obscures his way and reduces his whole being to mere physical 
existence in potentially hostile surroundings. Only after he has passed 
through the fog is he able to familiarize himself with this newfound envi-
ronment, as he emerges—dreamlike, nascent—from “hot gold” (7).  
With each step that he takes in this newly accessed world, we learn that 
Vaark enjoys his life as a landowning, independent farmer and trader, a 
life in which the color of his skin provides “relative safety” in the “ad-hoc 
territory” of the New World (9, 11). In this environment, “[h]e did what 
was necessary: secured a wife, someone to help her, planted, built, fa-
thered” (32). Hardworking and determined, his character can be said to 
embody a Lockean work ethic, which credits a man’s cultivation of his 
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land as a means of self-making by property. Locke describes in his Treatis-
es that, “[t]he labor of [a man’s] body and the work of his hands […] are 
properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature has 
provided and left it in, he has mixed his labor with, and joined it to some-
thing that is his own, and thereby makes it his property” (Locke 287-88). 
In other words, by way of characterizing Vaark as a successful settler who 
works on his land and cultivates it, he is qualified in A Mercy as a “pro-
prietor of his own person and capacities” (Macpherson 3). We could say 
that he meets a specific ideal of what Locke understood to be a proper set-
tler and a flourishing businessman at the time. 
Early on in the narrative, Jacob Vaark’s character remains relatively un-
corrupted. He captivates the reader with his high moral commitments and 
good judgment. When offered a slave as part of a debt settlement in a 
business transaction with the Portuguese slave trader D’Ortega, he ago-
nizes over the proposal and initially refuses a human being as debt set-
tlement. However, when he realizes that a slave will be the only compen-
sation to be received, he accepts Florens as partial payment. His decision 
to accept is also influenced by the fact that he is envious of D’Ortega’s 
large estate: “He had never seen [one] like it” (Morrison 13). On the way 
back to his farm, he decides to build a new house himself by investing in 
rum, which would mean an indirect reliance on slave labor. However, he 
believes that his house will not be as “compromised” as D’Ortega’s estate 
(25), for there is, as he explains, “a profound difference between the inti-
macy of slave bodies at Jublio [D’Ortega’s plantation] and a remote labor 
force in Barbados” (33). The supposed decency of Jacob-the-early-settler is 
thus lost when property becomes so important to him that he compromis-
es his former principles by relying on a labor force made of slaves to make 
profitable investments. The novel hereby exposes the underside of the 
Lockean paradigm by showing the way in which men like Vaark relied on 
slavery as well as slave labor for an increase of their property. It demon-
strates that in the New World, slave ownership may have lurked in the 
background, behind every self-made subject.  
Quickly after becoming morally corrupted by his involvement with 
New World slavery, Morrison eliminates Vaark’s character from the nar-
rative by infecting him with the pox and letting him die in his half-built 
mansion. In my reading this literary maneuver of elimination is meant to 
suggest that Locke’s vision of the European settler-as-cultivator cannot be 
sustained in the novel. With Vaark’s expulsion from the text, Morrison 
denies him any more space in the narrative—space that would be accord-
ed to him in the type of early Enlightenment text on which his character is 
based. By way of this refusal to characterize Vaark any further, Morrison 
writes against the continuous reiteration of the early modern discourse of 
proprietorial conceptions of the self that Vaark’s character represents. 
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The novel similarly evokes Locke’s early modern philosophy of the 
propertied subject with the character of the blacksmith. He is the subject 
of the ‘you’ that Florens addresses in her narrative,6 and he first appears 
in the novel when he is hired to forge the gates to Vaark’s new house. A 
free black craftsman, his trade enables him to make a self-possessed liv-
ing. As one of the indentured servants on Vaark’s farm observes, “He had 
rights […] and privileges like Sir. He could marry, own things, travel, sell 
his own labor” (43). In addition to his trade, his knowledge and medical 
expertise represent similarly important aspects that pertain to the con-
struction of his character within a Lockean paradigm. His knowledge, too, 
qualifies the blacksmith as a free person in the narrative because it equips 
him with the authority to make life-and-death-decisions, for instance 
when he nurses Sorrow through a life-threatening illness (125). The black-
smith’s character is thus constructed as a truly Lockean figure in that he is 
free by definition because he has a profession. In other words, his factual 
freedom, self-possession, and his strength of mind make the blacksmith 
into an emblematic figure of Enlightenment philosophy, who is in no way 
inferior to Vaark. 
However, the fusion of liberty and blackness is troubling to some of the 
novel’s characters, as it almost certainly would have been to Locke him-
self. For example, the equality with which Vaark treats the blacksmith 
startles Willard, who is appalled by the fact that Vaark pays the black-
smith for his work (148). It also worries Lina, Vaark’s Native-American 
servant, who sees disruption in the blacksmith’s appearance (59). The 
blacksmith’s emblematic status—that is, Morrison’s equation of a free 
black man with a free white man in the context of New World coloniza-
tion—is indeed a provocative narrative maneuver in itself. It is provoking 
because, historically speaking, the number of such free black people was 
very small and they often were not treated as equals, as the novel sug-
gests. Indeed, as historian Edmund Morgan has explained with regard to 
colonial Virginia in the 1640s and 1650s, black people represented a small 
and “conspicuous set of non-English immigrants” and from the beginning 
they occupied an “anomalous position” in the molding of early Virginian 
society (154). In this sense, Morrison’s invocation of the utopian figure of 
a free as well as propertied black man serves as another instance of inter-
rogating Locke’s notion of private property in that it conjures up the im-
age of the truly Lockean private entrepreneur (who is free by definition of 
his trade) while, at the same time, it complicates this image by creating a 
black and propertied figure. That this image is not meant to last is demon-
strated by the blacksmith’s expulsion from the narrative when he is at-
tacked—and possibly killed—by Florens.7  
While Jacob Vaark’s character can be shown to be composed as essen-
tially embodying the traits of the early modern subject of a hardworking 
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proprietor, the blacksmith, too, turns out to be both a propertied and self-
possessed subject. This is ultimately reflected in the way that Vaark and 
the blacksmith interact with each other in the novel, namely in a mutual 
exchange of free subjects. However, both men are violently expelled from 
the text and, I would argue, deliberately so, to suggest that the early mod-
ern subject needs re-configuration. I claim that this refusal of more exten-
sive characterization figures as the lever with which Morrison is able to 
formulate a critique of the early modern conceptions of the subject—
particularly its Lockean incarnation as freedom by property—on the aes-
thetic level of representation. At the same time, I contend that it allows 
Morrison to explore different possibilities of selfhood and freedom that 
are not compromised by notions of property. The narrative orbit of A 
Mercy becomes a testing ground on which the novel poses important 
questions to its readers, such as: what are alternative plots—historical, 
aesthetical—that we can think of which do not reproduce the early mod-
ern entanglements of property, freedom, and the subjection of a whole 
group of human beings? Let me pursue this question by turning to anoth-
er pertinent passage of the novel, in which Morrison explores one such 
possibility. This is the argument between Florens and the blacksmith, 
which is positioned towards the end of the narrative. 
Of Independence and Belonging: Florens as a Failed Proprietor of the 
Self  
In contrast to both Vaark and the blacksmith, Florens does not embody 
any of the Lockean features discussed earlier. Instead, she is constructed 
as craving for human kindness, probably because of the forced separation 
from her mother as a result of Vaark’s business transaction with D’Ortega. 
Morrison’s trope of the shoes illustrates Florens’s wish to belong in an in-
timidating New World. As Florens herself states, “The beginning begins 
with the shoes. When a child I am never able to abide being barefoot and 
always beg for shoes, anybody’s shoes” (Morrison 2, emphasis mine).8 Thus, 
on Vaark’s farm and as his property, she wears her master’s boots when 
ordered to fetch the blacksmith to help her sickened mistress. When she 
first meets the blacksmith, she is struck by his charm, and she immediate-
ly professes her unconditional love for him. Florens finds sexual attraction 
in the blacksmith but most of all she craves to be approached by him as a 
fellow human being in the hostile environment of the New World. As she 
states, “You are my shaper and my world as well” (69). When having ar-
rived at the blacksmith’s, Florens takes off her master’s shoes because she 
feels that she can finally belong as a human being.  
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Florens’s strong emotions build up to a scene in which she is confront-
ed with Malaik, a foundling whom the blacksmith has taken in his care. 
Florens is extremely jealous of this boy because she wants the black-
smith’s affection to be solely directed at her. The argument unfolding be-
tween the two positions the blacksmith as a realization of self-control and 
reason, as embodying the quintessential features of the early modern sub-
ject as understood by Locke. The blacksmith positions Florens as existing 
purely in an orbit of what a Lockean subject would conceive of as slavish-
ness; namely, a dependency on one’s own emotional desire and a strong 
need to rely on others. The scene begins with Florens asking, 
Why are you killing me […] I want you to go. Let me explain. No. Now. Why? 
Why? Because you are a slave. What? You heard me. Sir makes me that. […] I 
am a slave because Sir trades for me. No. You have become one. […] Your head 
is empty and your body is wild. […] You alone own me. Own yourself, 
woman. […] You are nothing but wilderness. No constraint. No mind. You 
shout the word—mind, mind, mind—over and over. (139, emphasis mine) 
Beside herself with anger and jealousy of the boy, Florens then attacks 
and probably murders the blacksmith. The dialogue illustrates that the 
blacksmith reduces Florens to what he thinks is her ‘wilderness,’ her al-
leged inability to control herself and her sexual desire. He approaches 
Florens as if she were a slavish body-thing, which due to its lack of reason 
remains outside of the early modern paradigm of individual liberty. His 
commandment to ‘own herself’ thus unmasks his own hovering existence 
in a microcosm of reason, self-control, and self-possession. Black human 
mastery remains an ambiguously narrow narrative window of possibility 
in that it tantalizingly mediates black male liberty; however, in being con-
structed vis-à-vis a discourse of belonging, as figured by Florens, the 
blacksmith's freedom, attractive as his refusal to be mastered may appear, 
is only thinkable as a (self)possession, a state of personhood for which 
love or desire for another person becomes a threat. In his quasi-Lockean 
mindset, the blacksmith cannot conjoin independence and belonging. 
For Florens the confrontation with the blacksmith signifies ‘emotional 
unbelonging.’ Her attempt to explain that it is indeed someone else who 
determines her existence as a slave—‘Sir makes me that’—cannot hold 
against the blacksmith’s meditation on the mind. The scene foregrounds 
the notion that emotionality in the form of desire, longing, and affection is 
not deemed valuable for the early modern subject. When finally Florens 
realizes that she has no future in the blacksmith’s world of reason, her 
equally emotional response of ‘murdering’ the blacksmith figures as a 
strong statement against his disavowal of her emotions. In contrast to both 
Vaark and the blacksmith as the embodiment of Locke’s work ethics and 
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early modernity’s reason, it is Florens in her vexed emotional state who 
ultimately survives. The narrative continues to tell her story whereas 
those of Vaark and the blacksmith are disposed of through death. Emo-
tionality and desire function as a possibility of human capacity, which is 
not shaped by a liberal imagination. At the same time, it is important to 
note that this possibility does not enable overly positive readings of her 
character9; it may in fact anticipate and expose problematic white concep-
tions of the enslaved as overly emotional and driven by desires (and void 
of reason) – conceptions used to justify the enslavement of black people at 
the time. Despite the fact that Florens returns to Vaark’s farm and begins 
to carve her story into the walls of the half-built mansion (155-59), she re-
mains abandoned, and it becomes clear that she has been severely dam-
aged by being treated as somebody else’s property (to say the least).  
Both her emotionality and her so-called ‘slavishness’ render her a 
‘failed’ proprietor of the self in Locke’s terms. It is in this narrative ploy of 
the collapse of the Lockean paradigm that Morrison finds a way to write 
against early European modernity. Florens states that “I am become wil-
derness but I am also Florens. In full. […] Slave. Free. I last”(159).  Despite 
the fact that we do not know what will happen to Florens beyond her 
immediate survival at the end of the novel, the narrative shows that 
Florens possesses a durability that she claims outside of Lockean terms of 
selfhood.  
In conclusion, A Mercy’s literary return to the ‘ad-hoc territory’ of colo-
nial Virginia results in a radical critique of the early modern Enlighten-
ment discourse of individual property and liberty. The early modern sub-
ject of this discourse figures in the novel as the propertied as well as self-
possessed man, who is embodied by both Jacob Vaark and the blacksmith. 
As is illustrated by the elimination of both the Lockean characters from 
the text, A Mercy ultimately refuses to participate in the repeated reitera-
tion of this aspect of early modern Enlightenment discourse. As a result, 
the narrative rupture created by the deaths of the two Lockean figures 
serves to destabilize canonical readings of the subject of the New World. 
This critique is continued through Florens’s character, who frees herself 
from the blacksmith’s world of the mind because she refuses to live in 
keeping with the principle of the Lockean individual. In this sense, in ac-
cordance with recent Black Studies insights on the topic, Florens is situat-
ed outside of the early modern paradigm of property and freedom and 
becomes a ‘failed’ proprietor of the self, as it were. As Saidiya Hartman 
reminds us of the complicity of slavery and freedom, it was “[t]he 
longstanding […] affiliation of liberty and bondage [which] made it im-
possible to envision freedom independent of constraint, or personhood 
[…] separate from the sanctity of […] proprietorial notions of the self” 
(Hartman 115). It is precisely in the ambiguity of Florens’s character that 
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Morrison’s literary intervention can offer an alternative reading to this 
dichotomy. 
Notes 
 
1  Earlier versions of this article have been presented as conference papers at the 
international symposium “Writing Slavery after Beloved: Literature, 
Historiography, Criticism” in Nantes, France, in March 2012, and at the tenth 
international conference of the Collegium for African American Research 
(CAAR) in Decatur/Atlanta, USA, in March 2013. 
2  Morrison herself states that she “wanted to see what it might have been like, 
to be a slave but without being raced; where your status was being enslaved 
but there was no application of racial inferiority” (qtd. in Jennings 645). For an 
excellent historical study on the relationship of freedom and slavery in 
seventeenth-century colonial Virginia see Morgan. 
3  I use the terms ‘negotiate’ and ‘negotiation’ in the sense of Mary Louise Pratt’s 
contact zones. Pratt describes these as referring to “social spaces where cultures 
meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly 
asymmetrical relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their 
aftermaths” (34).   
4  A Mercy generally has not yet received as much critical attention as many of 
Morrison’s other novels have. As far as I am aware, Stave and Tally have 
issued the only book-length publication on A Mercy. Other publications on the 
novel include a plethora of reviews (e.g. Updike, Donahue); a few scholarly 
articles that varyingly analyze the novel in terms of e.g. female resistance and 
empowerment (Putnam) or with regard to the election of the first African 
American U.S. president in the discussion of a post-racial US society 
(Cantiello). Strehle reads A Mercy as interrogating the myth of American 
exceptionalism by showing that this myth of a ‘chosen people’ “rests on 
pernicious binary separations between an elect and its Others” (109). Cillerai 
(“Introduction,” “One Question”), Bross, Curtis, and Logan discuss the 
pedagogical strategies of using Morrison’s historical fiction in the context of 
teaching early American studies. Also see Anolik and Schreiber 
5  I will use the following abbreviation from now on for the sake of convenience: 
Treatises for Two Treatises.  
6  Florens’s narrative opens the novel in the form of a first-person confession. 
The rest of the novel is narrated by Florens as well as by two other narrators. 
7  The narrative does not explicitly reveal that the blacksmith is killed. However, 
Florens describes how she and the blacksmith fight each other to a point when 
Florens sees him “stagger and bleed” (158). I read this passage as an indication 
that the blacksmith dies as a result of this violent struggle. 
8  In the course of the narrative, Florens wears different kinds of shoes, which 
mostly do not fit her. For example, she wears the “throwaway shoes from 
Senhora’s [who is her mistress before she arrives at Vaark’s farm] house, 
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pointy-toe, one raised heel broke, the other worn and a buckle on top” at the 
beginning of the novel (Morrison 2). Waegner discusses Florens’ ‘making do’ 
with all kinds of shoes not in terms of her wanting to belong, but argues that 
this “appropriation of the inappropriate” shows how Florens “navigates her way 
cleverly through the dangerous ‘ad hoc territory’ of the New World” (106, 
emphasis in original). 
9  For example, Vega-González has argued that Florens’s act of carving her own 
story in her own voice elevates her being from the orphaned status of loss (of 
her mother and her loved-ones) to one of female agency (131).  
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